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Capital markets and rm organization: How nancial development
shapes European corporate groups
Sharon Belenzon Tomer Berkovitzy Luis Riosz
July 12, 2012
Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ect of country-level nancial development on the formation of
corporate groups. Since cross-country regressions are hard to interpret in a causal sense, we use
exogenous industry measures to investigate a specic channel through which nancial development
may a¤ect group a¢ liation: internal capital markets. Using a comprehensive rm-level dataset
on European corporate groups in 15 countries, we nd that countries with less-developed nan-
cial markets have a higher percentage of group a¢ liates in more capital-intensive industries. This
relationship is more pronounced for young and small rms and for a¢ liates of large and diversi-
ed groups. Our ndings are consistent with the view that internal capital markets may, under
some conditions, be more e¢ cient than prevailing external markets, and that this may drive group
a¢ liation even in developed economies.
Keywords: corporate groups, nancial development, internal capital markets
JEL Classication: G32, G18, O16
1 Introduction
This study seeks to deepen our understanding of rms organization and boundaries by examining
how regional institutional di¤erences a¤ect the propensity of rms to form groups within 15 Western
European countries. We focus on one specic channel through which incentives to band together
may operate: internal capital markets ("ICM").1 In our setting, federations of rms (for example
the German konzern) are usually referred to as corporate groups (Faccio, et al., 2009). We test and
quantify the e¤ect of ICM on group formation by ranking industries according to their level of external
capital needs while also ranking countries according to their relative levels of nancial development.
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University (sharon.belenzon@duke.edu)
yColumbia University, Graduate School of Business (tb2122@columbia.edu)
zFuqua School of Business, Duke University (luis.rios@duke.edu)
1Section 2 relates our work to prior studies on groups and ICM (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna and Yafeh,
2005; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005; Morck, et al., 2005).
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Then we compare how the distributions of group-a¢ liated rms across industries vary across nations.
Our empirical test is thus whether within-country di¤erences in the probability of corporate group
a¢ liation across industries are conditioned by the interaction between a rms industrys dependence
on external capital and its countrys relative level of nancial development.
The formation of groups is often viewed as an intermediating organizational response to missing
or ine¢ cient markets (Le¤ 1978). This is an appealing argument with important strategy and policy
implications, but its examination poses three signicant empirical challenges. First, while it predicts
that group formation should be driven by market development, groups themselves may actually restrain
the development of the institutions they mimic (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Thus, groups which may
have arisen for reasons other than a response to ine¢ cient markets may go on to hamper subsequent
nancial development by limiting arms-length transactions. Second, omitted or latent macro variables
can be correlated with both nancial development and the prevalence of groups. Third, group a¢ liates
are often privately-held corporations under intricate ownership arrangements, rendering many groups
"relatively invisible" (Granovetter, 1995). This is particularly likely in the face of regulatory pressure
to be discrete about the internal reallocation of resources, which may be perceived as detrimental to
minority shareholders (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) or even anti-competitive.2
This paper is the rst to tackle all three of these challenges. First, we mitigate the reverse causality
concern by focusing on internal capital markets. If groups replace ine¢ cient nancial markets, we would
expect (i) a higher probability of group a¢ liation within capital-intensive industries, where a¢ liates
are more likely to benet from a groups ICM, and (ii) this relationship to be stronger in countries
with less-developed nancial institutions. A pure reverse causality argument is unlikely to explain
the interaction e¤ect between these two since a countrys nancial development is constant across
industries, and it is not likely to account for within-country systematic di¤erences in group a¢ liation
between high and low demand industries. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy to determine
whether the di¤erence in group a¢ liation between higher and lower external dependence industries is
more stark for countries with lower nancial development. Second, we develop a comprehensive dataset
on group a¢ liation and nancial information covering over 139 thousand (mostly private) European
rms. Our estimation strategy allows us to substantially mitigate unobserved industry and country
heterogeneity in addition to controlling for both country and industry xed e¤ects, by performing a
more rened test of our theory that variation in the relationship between external dependence and
nancial development among our sample rms is consistent with the ICM theory.
2 For example, in its rationale for blocking the Honeywell/GE merger, the EU Commission argued that GEs internal
capital resources would give unfair advantages to Honeywell (case no. COMP/M.2220, p 83-84, July 2001).
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Third, to mitigate the invisibility problem, we construct detailed ownership and control hierarchies
for groups by exploiting the strict reporting requirements of the EU, where both public and private
rms have to le annual reports detailing ownership and nancial information. Because ICM trans-
actions themselves are hard to observe, we employ an indirect approach (e.g. Dahl, et al., 2002) to
capture the impact of ICM. We identify conditions where internal capital should be more benecial
and systematically test whether these conditions are associated with higher propensity for rms to be
organized in groups. One advantage of our indirect approach is that it relies on the revealed preferences
of rms, rather than on reporting which may be polluted by rmsself-serving interests.
We follow the methodology employed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to rank industries according to
their dependence on external sources of funding, taking into consideration external funds dependence,
external equity dependence, and trade credit. Then we rank the 15 West-European countries in our
sample according to their level of nancial development using world-bank indices which consider the
stock market and banking systems for each country (Beck, et al., 2007). Though our focal countries are
relatively wealthy and enjoy developed legal environments, they nonetheless exhibit measurably di¤er-
ent levels of nancial institution development according to these ne-grained indices. To supplement
the accounting measures of nancial development, we also use measures from the World Economic
Forum, Executive Opinion Survey, 2006-2007 (Claessens and Laeven 2003), which capture local access
to equity and loan markets.
Our ndings strongly support the ICM hypothesis. We nd that high-dependence industries have
disproportionately more group a¢ liated rms than low-dependence industries, and that this di¤erence
declines as nancial development increases. This result suggests that less-developed markets dispro-
portionately foster the formation of corporate groups in sectors where internal capital markets are
especially benecial. Consistent with the view that small and young rms are likely to face higher
costs for outside capital (Gompers 1995), our results also show that the e¤ect of nancial development
on group a¢ liation is more signicant for smaller and younger rms. Our results are also strong for
rms a¢ liated with larger and more diversied groups, where ICM are likely to be more substantial.
2 Corporate groups and internal capital markets
2.1 What are European Corporate Groups?
Our paper focuses on a set of West European economies which: i) share a clear and consistent denition
of groups based on historical, institutional, and economical traditions; ii) exist within a narrow enough
range of economic development, so that we do not commingle developing and developed economies;
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and iii) have enough variation in their nancial development and industries, so that we may observe
the impact of a meaningful interaction between industry capital demand and country economic devel-
opment.
Group denition is important in our study because there are many incongruous conceptualizations
of what a group is. Since Le¤s seminal work (1978), scholars have found many di¤erent examples
of "rms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways, characterized by an intermediate
level of binding" (Granovetter, 1995, page 95). Mostly within the context of emerging economies, the
business group literature has emphasized features such as concentrated ownership, reciprocal trading
arrangements, and familial control, (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001, 2006; Kester, 1992). Concurrently, the
"pyramidal groups" literature has focused mainly on formal ownership structure and the often darker
sides of group organization within developed economies (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Morck, 2005).
We do not take a position on whether these streams speak of the same phenomena, and we do
not claim that our empirical sample overlaps directly with any of these types of groups. Rather,
we rely on the ownership-based EU denition of groups to ensure the consistency of criteria needed
for our empirical strategy. The concept of corporate groups within a Western European context is
codied in legal, cultural and economic institutions, and this reduces our dependency on theory for
assumptions about boundary conditions for group membership.3 Thus, our concern in this paper is not
so much with showing whether groups exist in Europe, as it is to explore whether the heterogeneity in
their prevalence across countries and industries provides evidence of an ICM mechanism behind their
formation.
Though prior work has found ownership links to be tepid determinants of group membership in
emerging markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006), there are strong reasons to believe that they reliably
demarcate group membership in our setting. In the EU, courts and government agencies specically
emphasize the concept of control as a condition for group a¢ liation. This refers to the direct and
indirect ownership stakes the controlling shareholder has in each of the corporate group a¢ liates
(Windbichler, 2000). Additionally, the notion of corporate groups is part of the economic environment
in the EU. For example, Figure 1 shows the ownership structure of a representative group, Berge y
Cia., which describes itself as "one of the major Spanish corporate groups."4 Similarly, a vast number
of rms in our sample incorporate group membership into their corporate identity, by including the
3Direct references to corporate groups are found throughout the EU governing documents, for example the Fourth
Directive of the Council of European Communities (1978), where accounting reporting regulations for groups are stipu-
lated: Whereas, when a company belongs to a group, it is desirable that group accounts giving a true and fair view of
the activities of the group as a whole be published.
4Obtained from Berge corporate website main page: http://www.bergeycia.es
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word "group" in their letterhead, websites, and logos, in addition to references to other group members
in their marketing materials.
The EU denition is also consistent with much academic work which focuses on corporate groups
(e.g. Delo¤, 1998; Morck, 2005; Smagns, 2006; Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005). Following Faccio, et al.,
(2009), we classify a rm as a group a¢ liate if it satises at least one these three criteria: i) the rm
is a subsidiary (that is, it has a controlling parent company), ii) it controls another rm; iii) it has the
same controlling shareholder as at least one other rm.
It is important to note that we do not attempt to capture every single rm or group within our
region of study. However, for our empirical strategy to work, it is paramount that our sampling
is representative of the distribution of industries within a given country, along the dimensions of
external dependence and country nancial development, and that it is not biased by rms that are
missing ownership or nancial information. For this reason, we exclude very small rms from our main
estimation sample, whose ownership and nancial data is not consistent across countries. Section 3
details our specic data construction and method for characterizing rms as group a¢ liates, including
a detailed discussion of our mitigation of potential bias issues. We perform a battery of tests to ensure
that our results are robust to alternate sample inclusion criteria.
Our focused empirical approach may limit the generalizability of our study, since groups (in the
broader context) are heterogeneous across time and place (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Nonetheless,
because our study focuses on how relative market e¢ ciency drives the partial internalization of trans-
actions within groups, our ndings should be relevant in other settings where "the group is an integral
part of the resource allocation mechanism," (Goto, 1982, p. 60). As well, we document conditions
under which nancial capital may be a valuable resource even in developed economies.
2.2 Internal capital markets
ICM have been observed within loosely tied groups as well as vertically integrated conglomerates,
albeit for reasons that vary (e.g. Perotti and Gelfer, 2001; Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005; Gopalan,
et al., 2007). For example, Carney et al.s 2011 meta-study of the broad group literature found that
nancial infrastructure development generally moderates group a¢ liation negatively, which lends sup-
port to the ICM hypothesis. Similarly, ICM have been found to lower the cost of capital for many
types of groups and give them access to nancial institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Gertner, et
al., 1994; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). ICM need not arise solely as a response to missing or signif-
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icantly underdeveloped markets.5 Even in countries with well-developed nancial institutions, ICM
can still improve access to favorable capital market conditions (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012), mitigate
asymmetric information between rms and capital sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984), or provide better
governance mechanisms via ownership than would be possible under lending relationships (Wulf, 2009).
Furthermore, these are likely to be more pronounced within countries where nancial institutions are
less sophisticated and information and transparency are reduced, even if overall capital liquidity is not
substantially lower.
However, direct evidence of ICM remains scarce, especially within European corporate groups (de
Haas, et al., 2010). Often, ICM transactions occur between sophisticated corporate group members,
and involve valuable yet intangible resources such as loan guarantees or deposit smoothing (Cremers, et
al., 2010), which are inherently di¢ cult to observe and quantify. Therefore, ICM is often documented
through inference, for example by observing correlated credit patterns (e.g. Dahl, et al., 2002) or
relying on nancial statement analysis (Deloof, 1998).
Within the relatively developed countries in our study, we would expect ICM to work through
subtle mechanisms like the direct funding of a¢ liates using cash ow from other a¢ liates with less
attractive investment opportunities, or the leveraging of group reputation and assets as guarantees
for the capital raising e¤orts of a¢ liates. Often, a corporate group may have nancing subsidiaries in
various markets, which are able to raise capital on favorable terms as a result of guarantees provided by
the controlling rm. For example, Novartissubsidiaries regularly issue debt that is guaranteed by the
parent, such as a $2bn issue by Novartis Capital Corp., the $3bn issued by the groups Bermuda unit,
Novartis Securities Investment, and the EUR 1.5bn issued by Novartis Finance (Luxemburg). In all
three cases, the debt was guaranteed by the parent, and accompanied by statements which obliquely
acknowledged the ICM nature of these transactions, such as: "proceeds will be used for intercompany
renancing purposes in connection with the pending Alcon acquisition, as well as for general corporate
purposes."
Our central question is whether the ICM that have been observed reect benecial side e¤ects of
groups (which may form for a variety of reasons) or whether the benets of ICM themselves foster
group formation. To properly address this, we systematically document the distributions of groups
across industries and countries. Quite simply, we look for groups to be more prevalent wherever ICM
would be more valuable.
5An issue beyond the scope of this paper is whether companies could migrate to the most e¢ cient nancial envi-
ronments within Europe and circumvent the deciencies of their home country systems. The current concensus on rm
mobility in Europe is that it is still rare, as it is largely constrained by taxation and jurisdiction issues. See Bratton and
McCahery (2009).
6
3 Methods
3.1 Empirical strategy
We study the e¤ect of nancial development on group a¢ liation by testing whether corporate groups
substitute for less developed nancial institutions. Here, reverse causality between group formation
and nancial development poses a serious identication challenge. This is because we might expect
lower overall incentives for nancial markets to improve in regions where groups already facilitate
nancing. Thus, groups may actually hamper nancial development, rather than be a response to lower
development. An additional issue is that simply examining rm-specic proxy for external nancial
dependence would measure external funding set in equilibrium rather than the demand for external
funding, and thus su¤er from endogeneity problems. The use of aggregate and exogenous industry
variation should be especially advantageous in this setting.
To deal with these issues, we analyze a key channel through which nancial development a¤ects
group a¢ liation: internal capital markets. If groups form as a substitute for underdeveloped nancial
markets, we should observe a higher probability of group a¢ liation for rms with a higher external
nancing needs, since they would benet more from access to internal capital markets. This should
be more pronounced in countries with relatively low nancial development since these countries have
more limited alternatives to raising capital. We follow the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and rank industries according to the extent that they rely on external funds by looking at U.S. rms.
The logic behind this strategy is this: (i) The U.S. is the most advanced capital markets in the world,
where publicly-traded rms face the least friction in accessing nance. Thus, the amount of external
nance used by these companies is a good measure of their industrys demand for external nance. (ii)
Disclosure requirements result in comprehensive data on funding sources. (iii) U.S. industry data is
exogenous to European rms, but major industries are structurally similar, so an industrys dependence
on external funds in the U.S. is likely to be a good measure of that industrys dependence on external
funds in our setting; (iv) groups are less common in the U.S., so U.S. rmsdemand for external funds
is a good proxy for demand in the absence of options for group ICMs.
Two main assumptions are needed for our identication strategy to work: that technological di¤er-
ences explain why some industries rely on external funds more than others, and that these di¤erences
persist across countries.
Figure 2 shows the logic behind our empirical strategy. We can readily see that nations with lower
scores in terms of stock market development also have considerably larger shares of group-a¢ liated
rms in industries with high external capital dependence. We dene the measures used in the next
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section. Though in our regressions we introduce a number of controls to better understand these
relationships, this non-parametric pattern is prima facie consistent with the hypothesis that groups
provide an alternative source of capital within less developed nancial markets.
3.2 Data
Our dataset relies on detailed ownership links and accounting information from the 2007 version of
Amadeus, a comprehensive European database by Bureau van Dijk (BVSD), which covers both private
and public rms. BVD has developed a format that standardizes nancial items across the various
countriesling regulations, balanced with a realistic representation of European company accounts.
A key advantage of these data is that by including private as well public rms, we capture a wide
range of rm sizes. In this paper we mostly exploit cross-sectional variation, across rms, industries,
and countries. Because Amadeus includes information for industrial rms only, we add information for
nancial institutions from BankScope, which provides ownership information for about ten thousand
banks. The nal estimation sample includes 139,254 rms, 50.6% of which are a¢ liated with 26,711
groups.6
3.2.1 Sample construction
In this section, we explain our three-step methodology for constructing the data and describe our sam-
ple. We rst identify which of the dyadic inter-rm ownership links reported in Amadeus or BankScope
represent a controlling interest. Then we use this information to map hierarchies of ownership and
infer group structure. Finally, we reclassify or drop some rms and groups according to a set of rening
criteria.
Ownership links. To ensure that the ownership links we observe represent actual control, they must
include a minimum share of voting rights. For private rms, a link is considered controlling if it has
at least 50% of the voting rights. For public rms, which typically have a more dispersed ownership,
the threshold is set at 20%, consistent with previous literature on public rms (e.g. La Porta et al.
1999, Faccio and Lang 2001). Our results are not sensitive to di¤erent plausible specications of these
thresholds. It is important to note that links between rms need not be direct. For example, if rm A
owns 50% of rm B, and rm B owns 50% of rm C, then rm A has a 25% ownership link to C.
Corporate group denition. We dene a corporate group as a set of at least two legally distinct
rms where one of them is a controlling ultimate owner according to the ownership links identied
above. Specically, this means that for a rm to be a group a¢ liate, it must meet at least one of these
6One has to be cautious when comparing these percentages with previous studies on business groups (e.g., La Porta
et al. 1999, Faccio and Lang 2002) because our sample includes private rms; previous studies focused on public rms.
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criteria: i) the rm is a subsidiary (that is, it has a controlling parent company), ii) it controls another
corporation; iii) it has the same controlling shareholder as at least one other corporation.
Estimation sample selection. We impose two additional conditions before nalizing our baseline
estimation sample. First, banks are excluded, as they are likely to face di¤erent considerations when
joining groups (the a¢ liation decisions of nancial institutions are beyond the scope of this paper).
Second, countries in our sample di¤er in their reporting requirements for small rms, because countries
have di¤erent mandatory lling requirements for them. Thus, many small rms simply do not le
reports in some countries. There is, however, no reason to suspect within-country systematic variation
in reporting patterns across industries. Since our empirical approach investigates the interaction
between industry and country measures, while controlling for country and industry level e¤ects, our
results are not sensitive to cross-country variation in reporting patterns. Nonetheless, we mitigate the
potential bias of voluntary disclosure by eliminating all rms that generate less than $10mm in annual
sales. This is a conservative threshold based on our research on BVDs data collection processes, which
included multiple interview with their experts and top executives. We perform a number of robustness
checks to ensure that our size thresholds do not introduce sample bias.
3.2.2 Industry external dependence
In order to thoroughly explore the interactions between nancial development and external dependence,
we use multiple measures of each, and interact them in multiple combinations. For external dependence
we use three distinct measures. External funds dependence is calculated by dividing the cost of capital
expenditures, in excess of cash ows from operations, over the total cost of capital expenditures. This
captures the fraction of the rms investment that are not nanced using internal cash ows. We also
follow Nilsen (2002) and Fisman and Love (2003) and focus on suppliersprovision of funds trade
credits. We construct trade credits as the ratio between accounts payable and total assets. Finally,
we take into account investment intensity, computed as capital expenditures over total assets. All
measures are calculated using American Compustat rms from 1980 to 2000 at the three-digit SIC
level (163 industries).
3.2.3 Financial development
We use four accounting measures and four survey measures of nancial development. Our use of the
word "development" in this context is consistent with much extant work. Nonetheless, some scholars
may consider the di¤erences we measure as capturing di¤erent "types" of development, eschewing the
ordinal connotations implied by terms such as "level of development" (Carlin and Mayer, 2003). Thus,
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we are careful to point out that whether a countrys level of development along any measure is higher or
lower merely reects whether a channel is more or less conducive to industrial rmsaccess to external
capital.7
To capture the relative development of various types of nancial institutions within a country we
rely on world-bank indices (following Beck, et al., 2007), which reect the development of a countrys
stock markets and banking systems. An important part of our empirical approach hinges on inde-
pendently evaluating the interaction of each of these measures with the measures of external capital
dependence. This is because our various measures for development need not be perfectly correlatedfor
example a country may have an exceptionally well-developed banking system, but stock markets that
are only average relative to other countries. Therefore, a composite measure of development which
aggregates all measures might obscure important variation.
For stock market development, we use (i) stock market value/GDP, and (ii) capitalization and
stock market capitalization/GDP. Stock market value is dened as the value of total shares traded on
the stock exchange (a "ow" measure aiming at capturing stock market liquidity), and stock market
capitalization is dened as the value of stocks listed on the stock market, aiming at capturing the size
of production organized in publicly listed rms. For the banking system, we use private credit/GDP,
the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions to GDP, and bank
deposits/GDP, the ratio of bank deposits to GDP, where bank deposits are the demand, time, and
savings deposits in money banks.
Our four survey-based measures come from the 2006-2007 World Economic Forum Executive Opin-
ion Survey (Claessens and Laeven 2003), which capture access to equity and loan markets. Access
to loan market is based on the question: How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with
only a good business plan and no collateral? Financial system sophistication is based on the question:
How sophisticated are the nancial markets in your country? Access to venture capital is based on
the question: In your country, how di¢ cult is it for entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects
to nd venture capital? Access to equity market is based on the question: How di¢ cult is it to raise
money by issuing shares on the stock market in your country?
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for rms and groups in our sample. On average, our
rms (including a¢ liates and standalones) have 392 employees (77 median) and generate $173 million
in annual sales ($28 million median). Panel B reports corporate group characteristics. Our sample
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
10
rms belong to 26,672 unique groups with 12 a¢ liates on average. Groups in our sample have abundant
resources: the average group holds around $6.5 billion in assets, however this seems to be driven by
groups at the highest end of the distribution, since the mean is $52 million, and the 90th percentile is
$1 billion.
Table 2 presents summary statistics separately for a¢ liates and standalone rms. A¢ liates tend
to be larger in terms of the number of employees, sales, total assets, and cash ow, but quite similar
in terms of age. In our econometric tests, we check whether very large rms in our sample are driving
the results.
Table 3 presents the variation in external dependence for a number of industries. Examples of high
external dependence industries include chemicals, research and development, information technology
and drugs, while low external dependence industries include concrete, metal and minerals, textile, and
transportation equipment.
3.4 Econometric specication
We estimate a Linear Probability Model for the likelihood that a rm is a¢ liated with a group. The
econometric specication is:
Pr(Affiliatei = 1) = 1Salesi + 2FinDevc  ExtDepj + 3Sales sharejc + 'j + c + i (1)
i denotes rms - the unit of observation, Salesi is annual sales of rm, FinDevc is the nancial
development measure for country c, ExtDepj is a measure of external dependence for industry j, 'j
and c are complete sets of industry and country dummies, and i is an iid error term. Similar to
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we control for the share of industry sales in each country. Sales sharejc is
the share of total sales of industry j (in which the focal rm operates) in country c: This measure is
computed using all rms in the complete sample where we make no restrictions on sales volume.
Consistent with the hypothesis that the di¤erence in share of a¢ liated rms between high and low
external dependence industries would be larger in countries with lower nancial development, we expectb2 < 0: The interpretation of b2 can be easily explained in terms of di¤erence-in-di¤erence. Taking
the rst di¤erence in probability of a¢ liation with respect to external dependence, holding country
nancial development xed, yields Pc = b2FinDevc ExtDep. Next taking the di¤erence in Pc
between high and low country nancial development yields P = b2FinDevExtDep. Therefore,b2 measures how much higher the likelihood of a¢ liation is at high level of external dependence with
respect to an industry at low dependence level when the rm is located in a country with a high level
of nancial development rather than in a country with low level of development. In the tables that
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present the estimation results we refer to P as the di¤erential in a¢ liation probability. This is our
main metric of quantication. In our regressions, di¤erential in a¢ liation probability measures how
much higher the likelihood of a¢ liation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with
respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level
of nancial development rather than in one with the lowest level of nancial development.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Baseline estimation
Table 4 reports the baseline estimation results for the interaction between nancial development, using
the World Bank accounting measures of stock market and banking system, and industry external
dependence. The pattern of results is consistent with our hypothesis: the coe¢ cient estimate on
the interaction terms between industry external dependence and country nancial development (b2)
is negative and highly signicant for the various combinations of dependence and development. In
unreported results we nd that a similar probit specication yields consistently similar ndings. Table
5 presents the estimation results using the survey measures. For each specication we calculate and
report the di¤erential in a¢ liation probability (P ):
The estimated e¤ect of nancial development on group a¢ liation varies for di¤erent development
measures, ranging from a -11.9 percent for stock market capitalization to -2.6 percent for bank deposits.
However, most measures have an e¤ect between -5 and -8 percent, compared to a sample mean of
a¢ liation of 50.5. Table 5 nds similar, though somewhat smaller estimates for the survey-based
measures of nancial development. We suspect that the survey measure may be noisier than the direct
measures, resulting in some attenuation bias.
An important concern is that industry specialization may be systematically related to country
nancial development. For example, countries may specialize in certain industries as a response to
the level of nancial development. If this were the case we would expect economic production to be
heavily concentrated in specic industries. We check the sensitivity of our results to such potential
industry specialization by excluding industries with country sales share of above 2.5 percent - the 75th
percentile of the industry sales share distribution. The results are not sensitive to dropping dominant
industries. For instance, estimating specication 1 of Table 4 yields as coe¢ cient estimate of -0.023
(a standard error of 0.004) on the interaction term between stock market value and external funds
dependence.
Our results are also robust to excluding very large rms using various di¤erent size thresholds.
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Estimating specication 1 in Table 4 using the sample where we remove rms with more than $100mm
in annual sales yields even stronger results compared to the baseline sample where we do not restrict the
sample of maximal sales. Under these conditions, the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between
stock market value and external funds dependence is -0.023 (a standard error of 0.004). The next
section further investigates how our results vary by rm size.
4.2 Firm age and size
We next explore whether the variation in country-industry interactions for di¤erent rm and group
subsamples is consistent with the ICM theory. We focus on two fundamental rm characteristics:
size and age. Stock market development is likely to play an important role in nancing smaller and
private rms for three main reasons. The rst is direct nancing, since smaller rms with insu¢ cient
collateral often have a hard time raising debt money via secured nancing.8 The second reason is
that stock market development increases private equity, venture capital funds, and angels, as these
investorsexits rely on IPOs and divestitures, which are both positively correlated with stock market
activity (Black and Gilson, 1998; Celikyurt, & Sevilir, 2010). The third reason is through competition
e¤ects. In countries with less-developed equity or debt public markets, small and young rms have
to compete for capital with more established rms. Assuming that the supply of capital is limited,
as clearly demonstrated during the 2008 nancial crisis, raising capital would be harder for small and
young rms in less-developed nancial markets.
Small and young rms should have on average more to gain by accessing a groups ICM under
conditions of lower external nancial development. Small rms typically do not have substantial
internal resources, thus that are more likely to rely on outside capital to nance their operations and
compete in the market place (Ernst, 1998). Young rms face the "liability of newness" (Freeman,
et al., 1983) and are typically more dependent on external nancing than older rms (Levinthal,
1991; Rajan and Zingales 1998). Firm age is commonly associated with higher levels of asymmetric
information between the rm and outsiders, such as lenders (Ritter 1984, Oliner and Rudebusch 1992).
Thus, the ICM theory predicts that the country-industry interactions would be particularly strong
when comparing small standalone rms to small a¢ liated rms, compared to when comparing large
standalone rms to large a¢ liated rms. The same reasoning applies to the respective comparison by
8The London Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is one example of how stock markets provide
direct nancing for small rms. It allows small rms (average market capitalization of $65mm relative to $1.1bn in the
NASDAQ) to raise equity nancing in the stock market. More than 3,000 rms have raised nancing through the AIM.
Between 1995 and 2008 this amounted to 64.4 billion GBP, and averaged 21.6 million GBP per rm. The importance of
AIM for small rm nancing was especially clear during the 2008-2009 global nancial crisis, as 138 rms were still able
to raise 8.5 billion GBP.
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rm age.
The results are consistent with these conjectures. Table 5 presents the estimation results for
breaking the sample by quartiles of rm sales and quartiles of rm age. In columns 1 and 2 we
see a large and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry dependence and country
development for small and medium rms (rst quartile of sales, with average sales of $12.6mm and
second to third quartiles, with average sales of $31.4mm). The di¤erential e¤ect for small rms is -6.9
and for medium-size rms it is -8.9 percent. In sharp contrast, the interaction e¤ect is e¤ectively zero
for large rms (fourth quartile of sales; average annual sales of $616mm).
The large rm sample includes very large rms, which are almost always a¢ liated with a group. In
unreported specications we examine whether the lack of results for the large rm sample is driven by
outliers by dropping all rms that generate more than $100mm in annual sales. This exclusion reduces
average sales for the large rms from $616mm to $80.3mm. The industry-country interaction remains
insignicant (a coe¢ cient estimate of -0.010 and a standard error of 0.011). Thus, we conclude the lack
of signicant results for large rms is not driven by the presence of very large rms in this subsample.
In columns 4-6 we report very similar ndings for rm age. For young and middle-age rms the
coe¢ cient estimate on industry-country interaction is large and is highly signicant; however, it is
completely muted for mature rms.
4.3 Group size and industry diversication
We next examine how our results vary by di¤erent group characteristics. We focus on group size and
industry diversication as measures of the potential internal resources available to a¢ liates. Intu-
itively, larger size can be associated with more resources, while diversication is less straightforward.
Diversication is likely to be positively associated with a more active ICM because a group with af-
liates in diverse industries is more likely to have a mix of low capital-intensive a¢ liates from which
to appropriate (supply) and high capital-intensive a¢ liates with better investment opportunities (de-
mand). Of course, from a purely risk-sharing perspective, groups with homogenous a¢ liates would
still provide ICM benets as long as any external shocks a¤ect some but not all a¢ liates. Nonetheless,
redistributive benets should accrue especially to diversied groups.
Group size and diversication are often related, with larger groups more likely to be more diversied.
Thus, as with the size/age e¤ects we discussed in the prior section, we do not fully disentangle the role
of large groups vs. the role of diversied groups. Nonetheless, we expect both large and diversied
groups to be attractive to potential a¢ liates in high dependency industries, so these e¤ects should move
in the same direction. Columns 7-9 in Table 6 break the sample to separately compare standalone rms
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to a¢ liates of small, medium and large groups (based on total group assets quartiles, with Q2 and Q3
considered "medium). The pattern of results is consistent with the ICM theory. The industry-country
interaction is zero when comparing standalone rms to a¢ liates of small groups, but it is large for
a¢ liates of medium and large groups (a coe¢ cient estimate of -0.016 and a standard error of 0.005,
for both group categories, with di¤erential e¤ect of -5.3%).
We nd the same pattern of results in Columns 10-12, where we split the sample by group indus-
try diversication. For specialized groups (where all group sales are within a single three-digit SIC
code), the coe¢ cient estimate on the industry-country interaction is insignicant, but for medium and
highly diversied groups the interaction is large and signicant (di¤erential e¤ects of -5.6% and -5.3%,
respectively).
There is evidence that banks play an important role in ICM dynamics. 272 of our groups (which
together have 3,105 a¢ liates) include a bank. We examine the distribution of these banks by group
size and industry diversication. 58 percent of the banks belong to groups in the highest size (assets)
quartile, while only 5 percent of the banks belong small groups in the lowest quartile. A less extreme
pattern holds when examining bank distribution by group diversication, with 42 percent of banks
belonging to groups in the top quartile of diversication. These patterns would be consistent with the
view that the observed patterns of a¢ liation to large groups may also be related to the presence of
banks in these groups. Evidence that the industry-country interaction estimates are driven by groups
with specic types of nancial institutions would strengthen our argument of ICM. It would also
provide more clarity on the mechanism through which the group ICM is accessed by a¢ liated rms.
However, such ne-grained analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. Future work should focus on not
just banks, but also other types of cash-cow rms such as life insurance and utility companies, which
may be prevalent in large corporate groups, and may provide steady sources of capital to a¢ liates.
4.4 Robustness checks
Table 7 presents estimation results for several robustness tests. First, we include the linear e¤ect of
external dependence, by not controlling for industry xed e¤ects. As expected, the interaction e¤ect
between external dependence and development remains negative and signicant and the level e¤ect
is positive and signicant. Then we explore whether the e¤ect of countriesnancial development
on a¢ liation may vary non-linearly across industriesexternal dependence by splitting industries into
quartiles of external dependence and interacting each quartile dummy separately with our external
dependence measure (Table 7, column 2). We nd negative and signicant interaction coe¢ cients for
Q2 to Q4 (relative to the baseline, Q1). However the coe¢ cient for the highest quartile of external
15
dependence is almost twice that for the second and third quartiles.
When we exclude acquired rms that have been with the group less than ve years (Column 3), we
nd the coe¢ cient for the nancial development and industry dependence interaction to be moderately
larger than the baseline. This would be consistent with a view where long-term ties are more conducive
to ICM.
In columns 4-7 we investigate the robustness of our results to di¤erent samples of Compustat rms.
Listed U.S. rms tend to be large and operate in more than one industry. Thus, measuring industries
external dependence using diversied rms may be noisy. We use Compustat line-of-business data to
characterize the extent to which rms operate in more than one three-digit industry code. The results
remain robust for including only specialized rms (Column 4). In Columns 5 and 6 we calculate the
external dependence measures based on rms with below and above median years since IPO. The
results remain similar for both rm samples.
In our main specications, we restrict our sample to rms that have at least $10 million in sales. This
is to ensure that we concentrate on rms that are unlikely to shirk on their reporting responsibilities.
However, we also check our results by including all rms regardless of sales volume (increasing the
sample to over 815 thousand rms). As shown in Column 7, the same pattern of results continue to
hold. Actually, the coe¢ cient estimate on the industry-country interaction and respective di¤erential
e¤ect are larger in the unrestricted sample, as compared to baseline estimation sample (where rms
are required to have at least $10mm in annual sales). In Column 8 we restrict the sample to rms that
generate at least $1mm in annual sales. The results continue to hold.
Lastly, Column 9 addresses a di¤erent selection concern: the availability of ownership information.
Our baseline sample excludes rms with no ownership information. These rms are likely to be
standalones, as ownership coverage tends to be much better for rms that are a¢ liated with groups,
even when the rms themselves are small. If the availability of ownership information systematically
varies by industry external dependence and country nancial development, our results may be biased.
To check whether our results are sensitive to missing ownership information, we add to our baseline
sample also rms with no ownership information, which we classify as standalones. As shown in Column
9, there is no substantial change in the estimated coe¢ cient on the industry-country interaction.
This strongly suggests that ownership information does not systematically vary along the external
dependence and nancial development dimensions. We repeat the same procedure for an unrestricted
sample (not reported in the table). We include all rms in the Amadeus database with non-missing
ownership information, totalling 1.9 million rms (of which 8.4 percent are group a¢ liated). We
estimate the same specication as in Column 9 using this very large sample and nd the same coe¢ cient
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estimate (-0.018 and a standard error of 0.002).
In unreported estimations, we address the concern that our ndings are driven by specic countries.
Using our baseline specication, we systematically remove each country in our sample (one at a time)
and nd that overall no single country drives our results. The coe¢ cients on the interaction between
stock market value/GDP and external funds dependence are very consistent, ranging from -0.017 to
-0.026. All estimations yield signicant and comparable di¤erential e¤ects.
4.5 Panel estimation
We estimate a panel specication of the e¤ect of nancial development on a¢ liation probability in
order to control for country-industry e¤ects. As discussed in Section 3.3, the descriptive statistics do
not suggest any systematic skewness across countries in the distribution of rms high and low external
dependence. Nonetheless, we employ a panel estimation approach to further ensure that the overall
distribution of rms operating in high and low dependence industries is not systematically correlated
with a countrys level of nancial development. Thus here we exploit time variation in country nancial
development.
Our approach investigates whether new rms are more likely to be established as standalones or
a¢ liates when nancial markets become more developed, especially in industries with high external
dependence. Our unbalanced panel from 1980 to 2007 starts with the 2007 ownership structure and
use M&A data to determine whether rms were incorporated as standalones or as a¢ liates. Firms can
change their ownership structures either by joining a group or by separating from one, so the M&A
history helps us trace back to the structure of the rm at incorporation.
We make the following assumptions: For rms that appear as standalones in 2007, we assume
that they were incorporated as standalones unless our M&A data indicate the rm has divested of
a¢ liates in the past, in which case it is reclassied as group-incorporated. For rms that are classied
as a¢ liates in 2007, we assume that they were incorporated as a¢ liates of the same group unless we
nd evidence of having joined a group post incorporation.
We use BVDs Zephyr database and SDC Platinum to identify about ve thousand rms that
joined groups in our sample in 1980-2007. Our econometric specication is:
Pr(Affiliatei = 1) = 1FinDevct  ExtDepj + 'jc +  t + it (2)
Where 'jc and  t are complete sets of industry  country and year of incorporation dummies,
respectively. FinDevct is country c level of nancial development at year of incorporation t. Stock
market value is available for 1988-2006, and private credit is available for 1980-2006. Because sales
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information is available only for the period 1997-2006, we do not control for rm sales. However, the
results are robust to controlling for average rm sales, rm-maximum sales (the highest level of the
sales the rm obtained in the period 1997-2006), and rm-year sales (conditioning the sample period
to 1997-2006).
Table 8 presents the estimation results. The general pattern of results continues to hold. For
nancial development (stock market value), controlling only for linear industry and country e¤ects,
the coe¢ cient on the interaction with external equity is -0.052 and is highly signicant (with a standard
error of 0.005). Controlling for industrycountry e¤ects only slightly lowers the coe¢ cient estimate (-
0.047), which remains highly signicant. We nd even stronger results for bank credit/GDP. Controlling
for industry  country e¤ects, this coe¢ cient estimate increases to -0.091, and is highly signicant.
These results imply that as nancial markets improve over time, new rms are more likely to be
established as standalones, rather than as corporate group a¢ liates.
We perform a number of robustness tests on our panel estimation, in line with those reported in
the previous section. We nd that reducing the sales threshold from $10 million to $1 million has
a negligible e¤ect (columns 3 and 10). Consistent with our results in section 4.3 we also nd that
most of our ndings are driven by a¢ liates of large groups (columns 4, 5, 11, 12). However, using
the panel estimation, the di¤erence between a¢ liates of specialized and diversied groups is less stark
(columns 6,7, 13, 14). Nonetheless, the coe¢ cient on diversied groups is still 15% to 20% larger than
for specialized groups.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper uses a comprehensive rm-level database on group a¢ liation in 15 European countries to
study the determinants of group a¢ liation. Our results indicate that the interaction between nancial
development and industry demand for external capital a¤ect the formation of corporate groups. We nd
that even in Western European economies, countries with relatively less developed nancial markets
have a disproportionately higher percentage of group a¢ liates in industries with high levels of external
dependence. This implies that rms are more likely to be part of corporate groups to access their
internal capital markets.
This paper contributes to the broader literature on groups by providing higher resolution on one
piece of this eclectic mosaic: European corporate groups. Our results highlight the role that internal
capital markets play in the organization decision of rms across nations and industries. We thus
directly complement and extend previous research on corporate groups, as well as provide empirical
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evidence for the role of ICM, which may have more general applications in other settings where resource
allocation is an important function. An important implication of our study is the nding that capital
may be a valuable resource even within developed nations, to the extent that ICM can be more e¢ cient
than the prevailing markets for capital.
There is compelling anecdotal evidence in support to our ndings. For example, J.P. Morgan (2009)
estimates that the portion of total synergies in M&A transactions attributed to nancial resources (such
as decreased cost of capital, tax shields, and nancial exibility) increased from 21% in 2007 to 40%
during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis, which reduced the level of nancial development for European
countries. Consistent with our results, the increase in nancial synergies was more pronounced for
smaller and less diversied rms with lower credit ratings.
Our ndings have several strategic implications. We nd that in some countries rms elect to orga-
nize into groups despite the many potential costs of group membership, such as governance problems,
tax avoidance, market power, and concentrated political inuence (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Ce-
stone and Fumagalli, 2005; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). While there are other documented
benets to group membership, our results are strongly consistent with the view that internal capital
markets are at least partially driving group association.
This study has also implications for M&A strategy. First, it may be relevant to rms engaged
in the valuation of group-a¢ liated targets. If separating a target rm from its group deprives it of
valuable resources, this may in turn impact its future performance. Second, reliance on ICM may lead
group a¢ liates to maintain less liquidity and reduce market transparency, thus hampering investment
and perpetuating market ine¢ ciencies (Teece, et al., 2000). Finally, M&A is an important mechanism
that leads to group a¢ liation, and this process requires approval by shareholders, who must weigh the
pros and cons of remaining independent versus tapping into the resources available to group members.
Several notorious cases, such as the protracted negotiations between VW and Porsche or KLM and
Alitalia, highlight the importance of appeasing both major and minor shareholders who stand in the
way of bringing a rm into a group. Often, stakeholders cannot adequately weigh the trade-o¤s involved
in such a transaction, which calls for better understanding of the less tangible dimensions of group
membership.
To the extent that costs and benets of group membership may vary by nation within the EU,
our results highlight the complexity in nding the right balance between shareholder protections,
anti-trust policy, and incentives to growth. Similarly, there are potential tensions between individual
countriesspecic constraints and collective EU goals. Hence it is possible that, even in a very narrowly
dened Western European context, no simple answer will arise to the question of whether groups are
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"paragons" or "parasites" (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
At a higher level, our work here relates to that which looks at hybrid organizations. Pure forms of
hierarchy and markets are becoming increasingly rare, due to the growth of a "swollen" or "swelling"
middle (Hennart, 1993). As many have noted, the "old" vertically-integrated mode of production is
breaking up, and is being replaced by inter-rm collaboration (Feenstra, 1998, Gilson et al., 2008).
Groups may be seen as hybrid forms of organization (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), and our study may
be useful to researchers exploring this type of framework.
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Figure 2: Differences in Group Affiliation between Industries with High and Low 
External Financial Dependence Across Countries 
 
Notes: This figure describes the difference in the percentage of affiliates between the highest and lowest quartiles of external financial 
dependence across countries. Countries are ranked according to their financial development in ascending order. Financial development is 
based on Beck et al. (2000, 2007), and is the average of stock market value traded and stock market capitalization over GDP (averaged 
over the period 2003-2005). External Finance Dependence is computed at the three-digit SIC level based on Compustat firms in 1980-
2004, and is defined as the ratio between capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. The number 
above each bar indicates number of firms. The horizontal lines represent the sample  difference in % of affiliated firms between high and 
low external dependence for below and above-median country stock market development  
4,356 
739 
2,260 
13,721 
36,438 
1,372 
4,216 
633 
26,221 14,222 3,567 
1,611 
859 27,146 1,402 
Variable
# firms/ 
groups Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
Sales  ($,`000) 138,770 172,808 2,408,520 11,831 27,569 181,881
Employess 122,477 392 3,919 14 77 478
Assets  ($,`000) 109,129 194,489 3,135,302 4,988 18,593 156,511
Firm Age 133,678 25 24 5 18 54
Cash Flow ($,`000) 104,116 19,584 923,785 -81 1,120 12,155
# of Affiliates 26,672 12 40 2 4 21
Sales  ($, mm) 26,672 2,612 28,225 20 92 1,320
Assets  ($, mm) 26,672 6,521 200,710 4 52 995
Cash Flow  ($, mm) 26,672 193 3,132 0 3 61
Industry concentration index (HHI) 26,672 0.68 0.24 0.38 0.66 1
Distribution
TABLE 1
Notes: This table provides summary statistics on main firm and group variables in the estimation sample. In the upper
panel the unit of observation is a firm, and in the lower panel the unit of observation is a corporate group. Firms are
included in the estimation sample if they have non-missing sales and ownership information, and generate at least
$10mm in annual sales.  
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MAIN FIRM AND GROUP VARIABLES
Panel B: Corporate group level
Panel A: Firm level
Variable
Affiliates - 
Standalones # firms Mean Median Std. Dev. # firms Mean Median Std. Dev.
Sales  (`000) 206,216** 70,058 274,916 37,941 3,328,597 68,712 68,700 21,791 630,547
Employees 444** 63,281 607 103 5,334 59,196 163 58 1,124
Assets  (`000) 252,243** 61,959 303,519 25,347 4,134,177 47,170 51,276 13,514 506,205
Firm Age 0.14** 67,847 25.1 18 23.4 65,831 24.9 18 24.1
Cash Flow 27,977** 58,697 31,789 1,539 1,229,523 45,419 3,812 816 46,255
TABLE 2
Affiliates Standalones
Notes: This table reports mean comparison tests for affiliates and standalones. The unit of observation is a firm. *** implies that the difference in means between 
affiliates and standalones is significant at the 1% level.
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: AFFILIATES VERSUS STANDALONES
Industry name
Number of 
Firms
External Funds 
Dependence Trade Credit Investment Intensity
Chemicals (SIC: 283) 1,088 1.01 0.17 0.35
Research and development (SIC: 873) 802 0.82 0.21 0.36
Information technology (SIC: 737) 4,491 0.60 0.25 0.50
Drugs (SIC: 512) 2,119 0.31 0.34 0.33
Industry machinery (SIC: 355) 1,395 0.19 0.18 0.32
Heavy construction (SIC: 162) 1,066 0.09 0.17 0.33
Rubber and plastic (SIC: 30) 2,718 -0.07 0.18 0.24
Transportation Equipment (SIC: 371) 1,617 -0.21 0.21 0.23
Textille (SIC: 22) 651 -0.22 0.17 0.22
Commercial Printing (SIC: 275) 1,217 -0.16 0.23 0.22
Metals and Minerals (SIC: 505) 3,346 -0.31 0.24 0.17
Concrete (SIC: 327) 1,063 -0.34 0.11 0.18
TABLE 3
EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES
Notes:  This table reports industry external dependence values for selected industries. External Funds Dependence is the 
difference between capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. External Equity Dependence 
is the net amount of equity issued over capital expenditures. Trade Credit is account receivables over total assets.  Investment 
intensity is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. These industry measures are computed at the three-digit SIC code level 
using Compustat firms for the period 1980-2000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Financial Development:
Industry measure:
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
Financial Development × 
Industry
-0.018**      
(0.004)
-0.108**     
(0.019)
-0.090**     
(0.015)
-0.057**      
(0.010)
-0.047**        
(0.016)
-0.147**     
(0.042)
-0.042**      
(0.012)
-0.254**     
(0.063)
-0.249**     
(0.049)
-0.034*     
(0.015)
-0.325**     
(0.080)
-0.288**         
(0.061)
ln(Sales ) 0.101** 0.102** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry Sales Share -0.714** -0.779** -0.737** -0.729** -0.750** -0.769** -0.709** -0.762** -0.701** -0.734** -0.770** -0.728**
(0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141)
Country Dummies (15) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC Dummies (163) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Differential in affiliation 
probability (%): -5.9 -6.5 -7.8 -11.9 -5.9 -8.1 -4.0 -4.4 -6.2 -2.6 -4.5 -5.7
% Affiliated 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5
Psedu R2 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Observations 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770 138,770
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP
Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions that examine the effect of financial development on corporate group affiliation. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm
level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. The estimation sample includes firms that have non-missing ownership
informations, and annual sale values greater than $10mm. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in
affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the percentile level when it is located
in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner (for standalone firms the ultimate owner is the firm itself). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
TABLE 4
 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROUP AFFILIATION
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Group Affiliation
Stock Market Value / GDP Private Credit / GDP Bank Deposits / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Financial Development:
Industry Measure:
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
External 
Funds
Trade 
Credit
Invest 
Intensity
Financial Development × 
Industry
-0.027**       
(0.007)
-0.110**       
(0.038)
-0.120**     
(0.031)
-0.024**      
(0.007)
-0.037**     
(0.012)
-0.107**     
(0.031)
-0.050**     
(0.015)
-0.074**     
(0.024)
-0.209**        
(0.064)
-0.013*     
(0.006)
-0.026**        
(0.010)
-0.069**     
(0.025)
ln(Sales ) 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.100** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry Sales Share -0.709** -0.746** -0.730** -0.705** -0.728** -0.715** -0.724** -0.738** -0.735** -0.720** -0.733** -0.722**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145)
Country Dummies (15) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC Dummies (163) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Differential in affiliation 
probability (%): -5.5 -4.1 -6.4 -4.6 -4.3 -5.4 -6.2 -5.5 -6.8 -2.8 -3.4 -3.9
% Affiliated 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6
Psedu R2 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166
Observations 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877 135,877
Aceess to Equity Market
Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions that examine the effect of financial development on corporate group affiliation. The estimation is cross-sectional (at
the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. The estimation sample includes firms that have non-missing
ownership informations, and annual sale values greater than $10mm. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation
sample.Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the
percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner (for standalone firms the ultimate owner is the firm itself). * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%.
TABLE 5
 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROUP AFFILIATION (SURVEY)
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Group Affiliation
Financial System Sophistication Aceess to Venture Capital Access to Loan Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sample: Small              Medium               Large        Young Middle-age      Mature Small Medium               Large        Low Medium High
Stock Market Value / GDP  × 
External Equity Dependence
-0.021**        
(0.008)
-0.027**        
(0.005)
-0.006            
(0.006)
-0.013*          
(0.006)
-0.025**        
(0.006)
-0.000   
(0.008)
-0.003           
(0.003)
-0.016**            
(0.005)
-0.016**            
(0.005)
-0.008           
(0.005)
-0.017**        
(0.005)
-0.016**        
(0.005)
ln(Sales ) 0.091** 0.129** 0.064** 0.085** 0.107** 0.104** 0.001 0.087** 0.123** 0.071** 0.098** 0.099**
(0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry Sales Share -0.616* -0.991** -0.156 -0.514* -0.787** -0.769** 0.049 -0.874** -0.647** 0.025 -0.648** -1.078**
(0.272) (0.203) (0.196) (0.226) (0.191) (0.276) (0.112) (0.157) (0.178) (0.150) (0.171) (0.180)
Country Dummies (15) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC Dummies (163) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Differential in affiliation 
probability (%): -6.9 -8.9 - -4.3 -8.2 - - -5.3 -5.3 - -5.6 -5.3
% Affiliated 36.8 47.6 69.9 51.8 50.9 53.3 7.1 36.3 27.0 18.6 32.8 23.0
Psedu R2 0.141 0.130 0.105 0.142 0.163 0.227 0.051 0.141 0.284 0.098 0.151 0.227
Observations 34,698 69,380 34,692 37,267 64,030 32,381 73,981 107,919 94,066 84,438 102,235 73,981
TABLE 6
VARIATION BY FIRM AND GROUP CHARACTERISTICS
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Group Affiliation
Group-levelFirm-level
Age Total assets Industry diversification
Notes:  This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions examining how the effect of financial development on corporate group affiliation varies by firm and group characteristics. 
The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. The baseline estimation sample 
includes firms that have non-missing ownership informations, and annual sale values greater than $10mm. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation 
is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in 
one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample: All All
Excluding 
acquired 
affiliates
Special-
ized
Below 
median 
years from 
IPO
Above 
median 
years from 
IPO
No 
restrictions
Sales> $1 
mm
Inc. 
Missing 
ownership
Stock Market Value  / GDP  × 
External Equity Dependence
-0.010**     
(0.004)
-0.019**     
(0.004)
-0.013**     
(0.004)
-0.017**      
(0.004)
-0.018**      
(0.004)
-0.024**     
(0.002)
-0.018**     
(0.003)
-0.019**     
(0.003)
External Equity Dependence, 
Interacted:
2nd Quartile -0.011**
(0.004)
3rd Quartile -0.010**
(0.004)
4th Quartile -0.018**
(0.004)
Industry Sales Share -1.732** -0.731** -0.720** -0.725** -0.705** -0.710** -0.387** -0.646** -0.247**
(0.108) (0.142) (0.144) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.077) (0.099) (0.072)
External Equity Dependence 0.033**
(0.009)
ln(Sales ) 0.104** 0.101** 0.103** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.075** 0.104** 0.087**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country Dummies (15) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC Dummies (163) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Differential in affiliation 
probability (%): -3.3 -5.9 -6.3 -4.3 -5.6 -5.9 -9.0 -5.9 -5.9
% Affiliated 50.5 50.6 49.9 50.5 50.5 50.5 19.4 27.0 40.5
Psedu R2 0.147 0.167 0.167 0.166 0.167 0.167 0.257 0.232 0.288
Observations 138,770 138,770 135,032 138,561 138,211 138,561 814,132 488,012 172,916
Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions examining the robustness of the effect of financial development on group
affiliation. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year
available. Columns 1-6 include only firms with annual sales over $10mm. Column 7 includes all firms with non-missing sales and ownership information.
Column 8 includes only firms with sales over $1mm. Column 9 adds firms with no ownership information (classified as standalones) to the baseline sample (at
least $10mm in sales). Differentials in affiliation probability measure the change in likelihood of affiliation at the 90th percentile level of external dependence
with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the
lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering
by ultimate owner. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
TABLE 7
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Group Affiliation. Probit Estimation (marginal effects.)
Compustat firms Estimation sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Financial Development:
Firms: All All
Sales> 
$1mm
Small-
group 
affiliates
Large-
group 
affiliates
Specialized-
group 
affiliates
Diversified-
group 
affiliates All All
Sales> 
$1mm
Small-
group 
affiliates
Large-
group 
affiliates
Specialized-
group 
affiliates
Diversified-
group 
affiliates
Financial Development × 
External Equity Dependence
-0.052**     
(0.005)
-0.047**     
(0.006)
-0.040**       
(0.008)
0.001     
(0.002)
-0.028**        
(0.005)
-0.019**         
(0.004)
-0.022**        
(0.004)
-0.081**     
(0.008)
-0.091**     
(0.011)
-0.097**     
(0.015) 
-0.002          
(0.005) 
-0.067**     
(0.011)
-0.040**      
(0.009)
-0.050**     
(0.009)
Industry Sales Share 0.191** - - - - - - 0.215** - - -
(0.076) (0.072)
Fixed-effects:
Country Yes - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Three-digit SIC Yes - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Year of Incorporation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Psedu R2 0.116 0.137 0.150 0.128 0.137 0.065 0.120 0.123 0.144 0.152 0.136 0.140 0.066 0.125
Observations 624,115 624,115 343,122 536,436 555,937 554,491 558,060 682,260 682,260 393,105 581,100 605,312 601,951 607,518
Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions examining the effect of financial development on group affiliation for a panel of firms. We focus on the fraction of newly established firms
that are formed as group affiliates. The dependent variable is a group affiliation dummy that equals one for firms that are affiliates to groups and equals zero for standalone firms. The panel is constructed in the
following way: We include firms that were incorporated in 1980-2007. We use the 2007 ownership structure to determine whether these firms were incorporated as standalones or as part of a group. We use M&A data
from Zephyr and SDC Platinum to eliminate firms that change their ownership structure in 1980-2007. Values for Stock Market Value Traded and Private Credit are for 1980-2007. Industry Sales Share is three-digit
industry sales as a share of total country sales per year, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through
clustering by ultimate owner. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%.
Private Credit / GDP
TABLE 8
PANEL ESTIMATION: THE FORMATION OF NEWLY ESTABLISHED FIRMS
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Group Affiliation
Stock Market Value / GDP
